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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATCHET EFFECT

Kevin M. Stackt

Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe take an inductive
and empirical approach to constitutional interpretation and
elaboration. They ask whether attributes of the Constitution
justify interpretive exceptionalism-that is, interpreting and
elaborating the Constitution differently than other forms of
law. 148 They conclude that the characteristics of the Constitu
tion they consider do not justify interpretive exceptionalismat
most, the "Constitution's principal distinguishing feature may
be the fact that people think the Constitution is specialthat it
has a kind of mythological status." 149 As Serkin and Tebbe see
it, the extent to which individuals view the Constitu-

t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I ani grateful to Chris Serldn for
helpful comments.
148
Christopher Serldn & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 COR
NELL L. REV. 701, 703-04, 749-51 (2016).
149
Christopher Serldn & Nelson Tebbe, Mythmaking in Constitutional Interpre
tation: A Response to Primus and Stack, supra, at 1.
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tion or constitutional law as special is best explained with reference to a broad cultural gloss, a shared ascription of a
particular kind of value to the Constitution rather than any
particular feature of our existing Constitution or constitutional
law. 1 5 0 As a result, interpretive exceptionalism appears to be
founded on accepting a mythology of the Constitution's and
constitutional law's special character.1 5 1 That thought in turn
prompts Serkin and Tebbe to worry about the ways in which
this cultural identification and valorization of the Constitution
poses distinctive risks. 152
I take up their invitation to consider those risks below, but
first notice how different Serkin and Tebbe's approach to constitutional theory and law is from more deductive and topdown theories. Under a more deductive approach, it does not
make sense to ask whether observed features of the Constitution (such as the generality of its terms) are able to justify a
distinct interpretive approach.1 5 3 Rather, a justification for the
Constitution's special treatment follows from arguments about
the Constitution's distinctive authority or distinctive legal
role-that is, premises of constitutionalism. On this view, the
project of constitutional theory is to provide an account of how
constitutional law performs a special function in our legal system, and then to develop interpretive theories on the basis of
that ascribed function. The arguments for the divergence in
constitutional and statutory interpretation that I make in my
first response proceed from that perspective.'1 4
From Serkin and Tebbe's more empirical viewpoint, they
want a showing-some proof-that constitutional law actually
performs a distinctive function before they will endorse its distinctive interpretive treatment. For instance, they insightfully
argue that constitutional law may not be particularly entrenched in the sense of being less subject to change than other
kinds of legal arrangements.1 5 5 So why, they wonder, does it
makes sense to continue to think of the Constitution and constitutional laws as distinctively serving a preservationist func150
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the ConstitutionSpecial?, supra note 148, at 771-72;
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supranote 149, at 8.
151 Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 7.
152
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 775-76;
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supranote 149, at 7-8.
153 Kevin M. Stack, The Inferencefrom Authority to Interpretive Method in Constitutionaland Statutory Domains, supra, at 5-6.
154 See Stack, supra note 153.
'55
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 753-59.
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tion.15 6 In this sense and others, they insist that constitutional
practices should bear out the premises of any constitutional
theory, otherwise claims of constitutional authority or function
are perpetuating a mythology. This raises deep questions
about the aims of constitutional theory, and the relationship
between more ideal theory and a cultural study of the practices
we identify as constitutional. 157
We need not resolve those higher-order questions, however, because even when we take a more empirical approach,
grounds for divergence in constitutional and statutory interpretation still emerge. These arguments for interpretive divergence arise as responses to observed pathologies. Consider, for
instance, Serkin and Tebbe's concern that the pervasive view of
the Constitution as special produces distinctive risks. The
constitutional risks they have in mind might be conceived as a
constitutional ratchet with three elements.
The first concerns use of the Constitution in politics. If the
Constitution is viewed as a repository of our deepest values, 5 8
politics can take strategic advantage by casting issues in constitutional terms.15 9 Framing an issue in constitutional terms,
when successful, "insulat[es] certain topics from political discourse because they ostensibly concern higher-order lawmaking." 16 0 Second, and closely related, that constitutional
framing distances consideration of an issue from the normal
politics that takes place in elected bodies and administrative
agencies. It also augments the role of legal argumentation.' 6
In particular, once an issue is decided or framed in constitutional terms, the wide range of policy and evaluative concerns
that might otherwise bear on its resolution must be translated
into the terms of constitutional argument and accorded the
weight that constitutional law grants them. Third, the Constitution's special status in our culture may make it particularly
tempting for courts to enlarge the range of issues for which

Id. at 758-59.
See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAw: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 37 (1999) (explicating the conditions and aims of a cultural study of
law).
See Richard Primus, The ConstitutionalConstant, supra, at 1-2; cf Serkin
158
& Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supranote 148, at 771.
159
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 775 (commenting on reasons political actors invoke constitutional categories).
160 Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 8.
161 Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 772-73.
156
157
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constitutional law provides an answer, 1 6 2 often in the form of a
constitutional right.
When these dynamics operate together, they have a ratchet
effect of transforming more and more of our political landscape
into constitutional politics. On the one hand, the Constitution's special status as a repository of our deepest values
means that what is constitutional not only changes with our
values, 163 but changes in a way that expands the scope of
issues touched by constitutional law. But once an issue is
accorded a constitutional status or right, it alters normal politics about the issue, and to the extent that courts become the
privileged forum for resolution of those issues, argument about
the merits must move within the constrained model of practical
reasoning provided by constitutional argument. As issue after
issue is resolved in a form of constitutional law rather than
resting primarily under the power of municipal governments,
common law courts, state legislatures, Congress, or the federal
executive, our already judicialized government becomes subject to the courts in a more profound way.
At an admittedly high level of abstraction, this constitutional ratchet effect may provide a diagnosis of an important
dynamic or even pathology within American constitutionalism.
It also seems to capture what Serkin and Tebbe worry are the
risks or downsides of our view of the Constitution as distinctively important and special in ways that are difficult to tie to
its attributes. Let us suppose that this ratchet effect obtains
and describes a dynamic in American constitutionalism.
Doesn't it, too, have implications for constitutional interpretation and elaboration?
I could imagine several ways in which it would justify principles of constitutional interpretation and elaboration. Here is
one way that argument might proceed: lawyers and the public
view the Constitution and constitutional law as distinctively
important, and the way which they do so ends up producing
the ratchet effect just described. Assuming that effect is generally undesirable-whether because it unduly impinges on the
scope of issues subject to democratic resolution or for some
other reason-an implementing rule could help check the judiciary's tendency to enlarge the scope of issues to which the
Constitution provides an answer.
162
Cf. id. at 776 (asserting that political actors leverage the lofty status of
constitutional law in political warfare).
163
Primus, The ConstitutionalConstant, supra note 158, at 1-2.
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Such implementing rules have deep roots in the American
constitutional tradition. One such rule, framed as a "rule of
administration," was defended by James B. Thayer in his classic article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law.1 6 4 Thayer argued that when courts are
faced with a question of whether legislation is constitutional,
the question they should ask themselves is whether "the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt."' 6 5 As Thayer elaborates this defense of a
kind of constitutional minimalism, he argues that "the ultimate
question is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but
whether legislation is sustainableor not." 16 6 Thayer's rule, developed with regard to the dangers of judicial review of legislation in particular, could be generalized to help address the
judicial tendency of finding too many constitutional answers,
with courts asking whether the Constitution is clearly violated.
I do not mean to suggest that an approach that mirrors
Thayer's is the only inference that could be made from the
ratchet effect, or that such a doctrinal standard would always
be effective.1 6 7 But if we see the constitutional ratchet effect as
a consequence of the way in which judges mythologize the Constitution, that observation can provide a foundation for principles of constitutional interpretation along the lines that Thayer
proposed. Notice that this type of argument for interpretive
exceptionalism has a different character than more deductive
arguments from constitutional authority that Serkin and Tebbe
want to avoid. It begins with an account of political risks or
pathologies and defends interpretive principles to address
those risks. For Serkin and Tebbe, the focus would be on addressing the constitutional ratchet or other implications of our
cultural ascription of value to the Constitution. Others, such
as Adrian Vermeule, have generalized this inquiry, developing a
theory of the Constitution based on an understanding of how
well it manages certain political risks.1 6 8 Following this path
leads to arguments for interpretive exceptionalism, but based
on functional accounts of risk or institutional tendencies. So
even if we proceed, with Serkin and Tebbe, by focusing on how
we view the Constitution, not theoretical arguments about au164 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1893).
165 Id. at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (1811) (Chief
Justice Tilghman)).
166 Id. at 150.
167 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 54-56 (2014) (examin-

ing a critique of "parchment barriers").
168

See id.
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thority, why don't those differences, and the dynamics they
create, also provide grounds to apply different interpretive prin
ciples in the constitutional and statutory domains?

t

Thanks to Aziz Rana for his help on an earlier version.
Christopher Serlctn and Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
170
Id. at 749-75.
171
Id. at 705-06.
172
Id. at 771-75.
17 3
Id. at 774-75.
174
Richard A. Primus, The Constitutional Constant, supra, at 3-4. Prirnus's
agreement on this point depends on his argument that categorizing a case as
"constitutional" depends partly on lawyers' perception that it raises important
issues. We address this argument in a moment. Kevin M. Stack, The Inference
from Authority to Interpretive Metlwd in Constitutional and Statutory Domains,
supra, at 3 ("[Serkin and Tebbe's article] carefully and compactly chronicles differ
ences in the interpretive norms (what they call arguments) applied by courts when
faced with statutory and constitutional questions. Their thoughtful account of
169

